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How to Guard Against the Risk of Living Too Long: 
the Case for Collective Pensions 
 
Michael Otsuka 
 
Abstract: This chapter provides a defense of a type of occupational pension, known 
as “collective defined contribution” (CDC), which is based on the idea that it is 
possible to limit the employer’s liability to nothing more than a set contribution (a 
“defined contribution”) while retaining many of the benefits of the collectivization 
(pooling) of risks of a traditional defined benefit (DB) pension. CDC can be defended 
against a freedom-based objection from the right via an appeal to the following 
Hobbesian voluntarist justification: CDC constitutes a “Leviathan of Leviathans” into 
which it is rational for workers to choose to associate in order to tame longevity and 
investment risks. CDC pensions that arise from and mirror existing income 
inequalities can also be defended against an egalitarian objection from the left, by 
demonstration that they can be grounded in Rawlsian principles of reciprocity and 
property-owning democracy. 
 
I shall defend the realization here and now of a type of occupational pension that is 
collective rather than individualistic in nature, as it involves the pooling, both pre- and post-
retirement, of the individual defined contribution (IDC) pension pots that characterize 
retirement plans in the US and the UK.* This type of pension, known as “collective defined 
contribution” (CDC), is based on a simple idea: namely, that it is possible to limit the 
employer’s liability to nothing more than a set contribution (a “defined contribution”) while 
retaining many of the benefits of the collectivization (pooling) of risks of a traditional 
defined benefit (DB) pension, which are absent in an IDC. Such a collective pension can be 
defended against a freedom-based objection from the right via an appeal to the following 
Hobbesian voluntarist justification: CDC constitutes a “Leviathan of Leviathans” into which it 
is rational for workers to choose to associate in order to tame longevity and investment 
risks. CDC pensions that arise from and mirror existing income inequalities can also be 
defended against an egalitarian objection from the left, by demonstration that they can be 
grounded in Rawlsian principles of reciprocity and property-owning democracy. 
  
1. The Risks of Individual Defined Contribution Pension Pots 
 
The familiar and increasingly common individual defined contribution (IDC) retirement 
savings plan works roughly as follows.1 A worker, and typically also one’s employer, make 
                                   
* I have presented earlier versions of this chapter at the Institute for Future Studies and the Universities of 
Syracuse, York, and Zurich and thank the members of the audiences for their comments. I also thank Nicholas 
Barr, Joseph Heath, Con Keating, Mark van Roojen, Juri Viehoff, Alex Voorhoeve, and two anonymous readers 
for their comments. 
1 In the US, the most common of these is known as a “401(k),” named after a subsection of the Internal 
Revenue Code that provides tax relief for such plans. 
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monthly contributions into one’s “pension pot” during one’s working years. The worker 
decides how to invest that pot. When one retires, one is able to transform these 
investments into retirement income by exchanging one’s pot for an annuity, which provides 
a specified guaranteed income until death. Alternatively, one can provide oneself with 
income in retirement by drawing down one’s funds, via withdrawals from a continually 
invested pot until it is depleted. 
 An IDC gives rise to significant exposure to investment risk. One must choose among 
multiple opportunities for investment (which therefore carry opportunity costs), ranging 
from bonds with relatively low variance and low expected monetary value to stocks and 
other equity with higher variance and higher expected monetary value. Seemingly safe low-
variance options typically carry the risk of erosion by inflation, against which it is costly to 
purchase protection. In order to protect against investment risk, workers are often advised 
to engage in “life cycle” (aka “lifestyle”) de-risking of their pension pots by shifting from 
equity such as stocks to less volatile assets such as bonds as one nears retirement. The 
rationale that is offered is that one should protect against a great fall in the value of one’s 
assets, from which it will be difficult to recover, close to the point at which one will need to 
transform these assets into retirement income.2 One is advised to do so even though this 
involves a shift into investments with lower expected monetary value. Historically, however, 
such de-risking would have been a typically costly and ineffective form of protection against 
downturns in the stock market for US and UK workers. In the vast majority of years from 
1948 to 2007, even those preceded by fairly sharp downturns in the stock market, this sort 
of de-risking would have made such workers poorer in retirement than a high wire strategy 
of remaining invested purely in equity throughout one’s career. Alternative strategies of 
investing purely in bonds, or else 50% in equity and 50% in bonds, throughout one’s career, 
fare even worse at the median for US and UK workers than life-cycle de-risking. All of these 
investment strategies involve a flattening of the market volatility of equity only at the cost 
of a substantial amount of levelling down into lower-return assets.3 
 An IDC pension pot also exposes an individual to longevity risk. If one knew exactly 
how long one would live in retirement, one could budget to cover precisely that number of 
years. But one typically doesn’t know the date of one’s death. So, with IDC, one must either 
take out insurance against living a long time, via the purchase of the guaranteed income of 
an annuity, or else draw down one’s pot in retirement. An annuity carries significant upfront 
costs, which vary unpredictably depending on the moment at which one purchases it.4 With 
income drawdown, one runs the risk of one’s money running out before one dies. 
Drawdown is deemed one of the more difficult options for an individual to navigate, since, 
not only does one not know how long one will live, but one doesn’t know how much the 
investments in one’s pot will grow or shrink during retirement.5 
 
 
                                   
2 This rationale is more applicable to those who plan to convert their entire pension pot into an annuity at 
retirement than to those who plan to remain continually invested in retirement for income drawdown. 
3 See Cannon and Tonks (2013). They also found that the median lifestyle or life-cycle de-risked pension pot 
across sixteen different OECD countries would have been only 73.4% as large at retirement as the median pot 
that had been invested in equities throughout. 
4 On the volatility of annuity rates, see Merton (2014). 
5 See Brown and McInnes (2014, 18).  
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2. The Leviathan as the Solution to Longevity and Investment Risks  
 
By joining together as a collective in the manner famously depicted on the frontispiece of 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, it is possible to tame the longevity and investment risks we face as 
individuals each with our own private IDC pot.  
 First let us consider longevity risk. By the law of large numbers, each generation 
(cohort) of the same age that retires at the same time has a predictable, “statistically stable” 
(low variance) post-retirement average longevity which is typically somewhat higher than 20 
years. This knowledge facilitates precise budgeting. Our prediction of the average longevity 
of the cohort might end up missing the mark, but not by much. We can contrast this with 
the much wider range of live possibilities for which we need to plan and budget in the case 
of any given individual, who might live anywhere from one to forty years beyond 
retirement. Though each individual’s longevity varies unpredictably, we can solve this 
problem by risk pooling into a large collective whose average longevity is predictable within 
a small margin of error. This involves mutual covenants to transfer contributions from those 
with below average longevity to those with above average longevity. We draw down our 
collectivized pension pot on these terms to ensure that nobody’s payments run out before 
he dies. Each member of the collective is treated as an individual. There is no involuntary 
sacrifice of anyone’s expected interests for the sake of the greater good. 
 Investment risk remains. This risk is tamed by our Leviathan entering into covenants 
with younger Leviathans (cohorts). The different cohorts are bound together into a 
multigenerational corporate body. The cohorts whose invested contributions exceed the 
expected growth rate agree to transfer to cohorts whose investments fall short, thereby 
smoothing over investment risk and allowing constant investment in high yield, high risk 
assets. 
 A collective pension can therefore be justified as a “Leviathan of Leviathans.” Each 
first-order Leviathan is created by a set of covenants that unites the members of a cohort 
who will retire at the same time. Such covenants are to the mutual benefit of each, as they 
pool and tame the longevity risk that each faces as an individual. The different cohorts in 
turn will find it rational to enter into covenants with one another in order to pool and 
smooth over the investment risk that remains. 
 In comparison with such a collective pension scheme, an IDC is a pension scheme 
consisting of a single member. Within at most a few decades, his working life and his life 
itself will come to an end. This is for the simple reason that the “days of our 
years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, 
yet is their strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away” (Psalms 
90:10). When he retires, an individual’s one-person pension fund will stop receiving further 
contributions into it. If he would like a guaranteed pension income for life, he will need to 
arrange for the assets of his pension scheme to be “bought out” by an insurance company 
that provides an annuity in exchange. As noted above, such an individual will feel pressure 
to de-risk his pension fund from stocks to bonds, in order to provide protection against the 
risk of a great fall in the value of his assets just before the point of exchange for an annuity. 
 Things are very different in the case of a collective pension scheme, especially a large 
multi-employer one that pools the pensions contributions of workers across an entire sector 
and keeps these assets pooled during the retirements as well as the working lives of each 
individual. The multigenerational corporate body that arises via a collective pension scheme 
is “an ongoing entity with a long-time horizon,” which can, given realistic assumptions, 
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remain continually invested in higher risk, higher expected yield assets, in order to provide 
each of the individuals that constitute this collective a better pension than she could hope 
to generate through her own personal IDC pension pot: “In a pooled-asset ... plan, ... while 
the individual worker ages one year per year, the collective group of workers does not age 
as rapidly as any individual, so that the portfolio can remain invested longer in higher return 
assets such as equities, infrastructure and private equity.” (Brown and McInnes 2014, 23, 
17)6 
 Before drawing this section to a close, I would like to propose that we rename this 
“Leviathan of Leviathans” a “social union of social unions.” This more collegial and less 
forbidding latter phrase from Rawls (1971, §79) is also more accurate than the Hobbesian 
notion, since we don’t need an authoritarian sovereign to secure the collective benefit. We 
have Rawlsian cooperation rather than mere coordination.7 Although here he is discussing 
the complementary nature of different people’s realized talents rather than their longevity 
and investment risk pooling, the following passage from Rawls nevertheless serves as a fairly 
accurate description of the nature of the intra- and inter-generational unions that constitute 
a collective pension: 
 
[I]t is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members 
that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the 
others. ...This community may also be imagined to extend over time, and therefore 
in the history of a society the joint contributions of successive generations can be 
similarly conceived. (1971, 523) 
 
In other words that modify Burke’s famous description of “society” as “a contract,” a 
collective pension constitutes “a partnership not only between those who are living 
[working], but between those who are living [working], those who are dead [retired], and 
those who are to be born [employed].” (Burke 1835, 498) 
 
3. From Defined Benefit (DB) to Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) 
 
Traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions are collective in nature. They deliver their benefits 
via the investment and longevity risk pooling described in the previous section. On account 
of such risk pooling, they are more efficient than IDC pots at generating pensions income.8 
 In spite of this advantage, DB pensions are an endangered species. They are derided 
as obsolete, collectivist relics. Public sector and state DB pensions that are “pay as you go” 
rather than funded are regularly branded Ponzi schemes. Especially in the US and the UK, 
there has also been a seemingly inexorable decline in funded DB pensions in the private 
                                   
6 The regulation and management of collective occupational schemes in the UK in recent years has involved a 
failure to recognize the ongoing, corporate, multi-generational existence of multi-employer pension schemes 
such as the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS). Funding requirements and practices in the UK are 
based on the premise that one must have enough assets on hand so that one can wind up one’s pension 
scheme in the relatively near future. 
7 Rawls writes: “Cooperation is distinct from merely socially coordinated activity, for example, from activity 
coordinated by orders issued by some central authority. Cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and 
procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct.” (1993, 16) 
8 It has been estimated that these two factors provide DB with at least a 20% advantage over IDC. See Brown 
and McInnes (2014, 23-24). 
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sector. Private sector employers are abandoning DB mainly on account of the risks to them 
of having to make up for shortfalls in the funding requirements that are imposed by 
government regulations and the high and volatile liabilities such pensions place on a firm’s 
balance sheets under current international accounting standards. 
 I shall not argue here for the revival of occupational DB pension schemes in the 
private sector. Rather, I shall draw attention to and defend a type of pension known as 
collective defined contribution (CDC). Because, like DB, it is a form of collective pension 
provision, CDC shares many of the benefits of DB over IDC. CDC is, however, a more viable 
form of collective pension than DB under current circumstances, since it addresses the 
aforementioned employers’ objections to the latter. CDC would not add any debt to 
employer balance sheets, since the benefits to workers do not constitute a promise. Rather 
than making any promises that the employer might have to make good on through an 
increase in their contribution rates, CDC relies on targets. If the targets turn out over time to 
have been too optimistic, workers make good the shortfalls via a reduction in their future or 
current pensions income, which might later be restored if the financial situation improves. 
CDC should also be attractive to employers because it would make it possible for them to 
provide better pensions in comparison with IDC without contributing a penny more in 
contributions. 
 Strictly speaking, CDC is a type of DC pension. Like the more familiar IDC version of 
DC, and unlike DB, risks are placed on workers rather than employers. But, with CDC, risks 
are borne by workers collectively rather than individually, in a manner reminiscent of the 
insurance schemes of friendly and mutual societies tracing back to the 18th century.9 
Longevity risk is pooled and investment risk is smoothed via the methods of a collective 
pension described in my earlier discussion of the “Leviathan.” Under CDC, workers who 
happen to retire when the stock market is at a peak typically end up doing less well than 
they would have done under IDC. But workers who retire when the stock market is lower 
end up doing better. As I shall explain below, the collective investment of pensions 
contributions post-retirement as well as pre-retirement provides further advantages, the 
upshot of which is that the median return is higher under CDC than under IDC.10 
 Versions of CDC have been extensively pioneered in the Netherlands and Denmark in 
recent years.11 Those in the Netherlands are constructed to deliver pensions that 
approximate the DB pensions they have replaced. Pension income is typically set as a 
percentage of career average salary multiplied by the number of years worked. This 
percentage might be determined as that which could be delivered given the best estimate 
of the average rate of return on pension fund investments. Unlike a DB pension, this 
formula for pension income constitutes a target rather than a promise. One’s pension might 
                                   
9 See Heath (2006, 333-34). 
10 Although risks to workers are mitigated in comparison with IDC because pooled, CDC does not protect 
workers as fully against longevity and investment risks as DB does, given that the latter entirely shifts most of 
these risks onto employers. 
11 “[I]n the case of both Denmark and the Netherlands, CDC arrangements are an integral part of pension 
systems that are recognised world-wide as being high quality. According to the 2012 Melbourne Mercer Global 
Pension Index, the Danish pension system was ranked number 1 on a list of 18 countries that fully reflect the 
significant range of different pension systems around the world. The Netherlands was ranked second on this 
list, which takes into account the adequacy, sustainability and integrity of a pension system.” (UK Department 
of Works and Pensions, 2013, 47.) 
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be reduced in the light of lower than predicted investment returns and other 
uncertainties.12 
 There are also versions of CDC that retain many aspects of a DC pension. It would 
not be difficult to transform IDC pensions into such CDC pensions, thereby providing a 
pathway to CDC in those countries in which IDC dominates. A simple and elegant form of 
CDC called “SAFE” mimics individual DC pension pots with notional pots. One’s notional pot 
consists of the actual value of one’s employer and employee contributions, plus the 
investment growth of an actual fund into which all employer and employee contributions 
are collectively invested.13 This collective fund remains constantly invested mainly in return 
seeking assets such as equity. To guard against investment risk, the growth of one’s notional 
pot is smoothed by a “collar”: all investment growth over 8% goes, not into one’s pot, but 
rather into a reserve fund that is used to support a 0% floor, so that one’s pot remains 
unchanged in cash terms in years in which the fund’s performance is negative. If, as is 
predicted will happen over time, the money in the reserve fund exceeds the money needed 
to support the floor, then people are paid bonuses into their notional pots. Upon 
retirement, these pots are converted into targeted pensions via a commutation factor of 20: 
$20 from one’s pot for every $1 of annual pension income. This commutation factor remains 
relatively constant over time, even as the market price of annuities goes up and down. This 
is a further respect, beyond the collar, in which there is smoothing in order to pool 
investment risk among workers.14 
 
 
Figure 1: Historic CDC versus IDC performance (Source: Wesbroom et al., 2013, 40) 
 The pooling of risks via CDC renders pension income in retirement both less 
unpredictable and higher at the median, relative to IDC. The above graph captures Aon 
Hewitt’s modelling of the pension that would have been generated at retirement via CDC 
                                   
12 See Bovenberg et al. (2016). 
13 Insofar as these notional pots are convertible into actual pots for those who leave the scheme, portability to 
other schemes would be a straightforward matter. 
14 See Davis and Madland (2013, 14-17) for further details regarding the mechanics of SAFE. 
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(green line) as compared with various IDC pots. On their modelling, IDC “lifestyle” de-risking 
(red line) provides a superior pension, in comparison with 100% IDC investment in equity 
(black line), in only a small minority of the years modelled; moreover, it does so at the cost 
of a significant lowering of the median performance. By contrast, CDC provides a superior 
pension to IDC equity across a greater number of years. Furthermore, the median 
performance of CDC is slightly higher than that of IDC equity. CDC efficiently fills in the 
valleys of a high-risk, high-return investment in equity via transfers of benefits from the 
peaks.  By comparison, both IDC alternatives to equity – low-risk UK government bonds in 
the form of “gilt” (gold line) as well as “lifestyle” de-risking – inefficiently reduce high 
variance by levelling pensions down below the valleys as well as the peaks of equity 
throughout most of the modelled time period.15  
 It is significant that, under CDC, unlike IDC, and like DB, one’s pensions contributions 
remain collectively invested in the pension fund during one’s retirement as well as one’s 
working career. Such collective investment eliminates the pressure that individuals with IDC 
pots face to de-risk from stocks to bonds as they near retirement and the cost of purchasing 
an annuity to secure a reliable lifetime pension from retirement until death.16 As Wesbroom 
et al. explain, this contrast provides a primary reason for the superior performance of CDC 
over IDC in providing pension income: 
 
The fact that pensions are paid from the plan rather than being purchased by way of 
annuities in the open market means that greater amounts can be held in return 
seeking assets, thereby leading to superior expected outcomes. Annuities backed by 
bonds represent poor investment decisions, if expected pension lifetimes are 25 or 
30 years or even more. In addition, avoiding an annuity purchase means that the 
profit margin and cost of capital for an insurer are avoided, and more of the assets 
are applied to improving members’ benefits. (2013, 5) 
 
4. The Hobbesian Voluntarist Case for the Freedom to Be Bound by a CDC 
 
In a document entitled “Freedom and Choice in Pensions,” the recent Chancellor of the UK 
Exchequer voices the following appeal to “pension freedoms” that resonates with many on 
the right: 
 
This government believes in the principle of freedom. Individuals who have worked 
hard and saved responsibly throughout their adult life should be trusted to make 
their own decisions with their pension savings.... [Therefore], individuals from the 
age of 55 with a defined contribution pension will be able to access their entire 
pension flexibly if they wish. Annuities will remain the right product for some, but I 
                                   
15 See Wesbroom et al. (2013, 40). The UK Department of Works and Pensions (DWP) commissioned the 
Pensions Policy Institute (PPI) “to seek to independently replicate the approach taken by Aon.” The PPI’s 
modelling yielded “a similar [income] replacement rate [in retirement] to Aon Hewitt when similar 
assumptions are used.” The PPI found, however, that “CDC outperforms DC to a lesser extent compared to 
Aon Hewitt’s reported results.” For example, “If we compare our CDC result against Aon’s reported median DC 
lifestyle outcome (20%), CDC produces results approximately 48% higher than DC. Aon found this result to be 
66%.” See Popat et al. (2015, slides 9, 50-51). 
16 Recall the explanation for this in Section 2 above. 
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believe that people should be free to make their own choice about how to use their 
savings. ...I want as many people as possible to be able to access their pension 
flexibly. (Osborne 2014, 3) 
 
 Is there a good case, based on the values of freedom and flexibility of choice, for 
employers to provide their employees with options beyond enrolment in a CDC (or 
otherwise collective) pension scheme? In particular, should they provide workers with the 
options to invest in an IDC instead of, or as well as, a CDC pension pot, along with all of the 
former Chancellor’s pension freedoms to convert or cash in one’s pension pot? The answer 
is “no” if these options encompass an inalienable and unconditional liberty to withdraw 
from the CDC collective by, for example, cashing in and withdrawing the monetary value of 
one’s notional pension pot at point of retirement. Such an inalienable right is really a 
restriction on the freedom of workers to bind themselves on terms of their own choosing 
that will make them better off collectively. It is, in fact, contrary to the free market values 
that champions of pension freedoms profess, as it prevent workers from making primarily 
self-regarding choices more effectively. CDC pensions are not collectivist rather than 
individualistic. They’re both: a mutual society into which each individual voluntarily 
associates and thereby binds himself. 
 There are at least two reasons why the gains of CDC risk pooling would be 
threatened by what economists call “adverse selection” if people were allowed to withdraw 
their pension pots from the collective fund at retirement.17 First, the effectiveness of CDC in 
pooling longevity risk would be undermined. By the time they retire, people will have a 
better idea of their life expectancy than they did when they entered the pension scheme as 
young adults, since they will know how healthy they have managed to remain over the past 
several decades of their working life. Those who know at that point that they are likely to 
live longer than average will have more of an incentive to receive a CDC pension than those 
who know that they are likely to live shorter on average, the latter of whom will have more 
reason to draw down their pension pot individually, if they are able to do so. The long-lived 
might not, however, have enough to generate sufficient pension income if they pool only 
among themselves. A second reason why an inalienable right to withdraw and cash in one’s 
DC pot at retirement would undermine a CDC scheme is that it would render it less effective 
in pooling investment risk. People who reach the age at which they would like to retire 
when the stock market is high or when annuities on the insurance market are a good deal 
will have an incentive to withdraw their pension pots from the CDC scheme at that point. 
That will make it more difficult to smooth investment risk between lucky and unlucky 
cohorts. 
 Without undermining risk pooling, employers could provide workers with pension 
freedoms on the following terms. They could provide each with the choice of entering into 
the CDC risk pooling option when and only when they join the pension scheme, typically at 
the outset of their career in the case of a sector-wide multi-employer occupational scheme. 
Having signed up, they would need to remain collectively invested from that point onward, 
or else pay a heavy penalty for withdrawing.18 At the outset, but only at the outset, they 
                                   
17 A classic text on adverse selection is Arrow (1963). 
18 Members could, however, be provided with the option of moving from one to another collective fund, 
within the CDC pension scheme, where these different collective funds would involve different ethical 
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would also have the choice to invest in traditional IDC, which provides them with complete 
freedom to cash in, or draw down, etc., when they retire. All this would be consistent with 
pension freedoms, assuming, as one should, that freedom encompasses the right to bind 
oneself. In the case of Ulysses, such binding was necessary to protect himself against the 
indulgence of his imprudent impulses. Here, the binding would not be for the purpose of 
protecting individuals against such weakness of will. Rather, its point would be to prevent 
rational defections from a pension scheme that would destroy the cooperative benefit of 
risk pooling for the reasons sketched in the preceding paragraph.19 
 For the following reason, provision of such a limited choice to opt out of CDC and go 
it alone would not threaten the viability of the collective scheme. At typical point of entry at 
the beginning of one’s career in a given occupation, each will be choosing under a fairly 
thick natural veil of ignorance regarding his or her own prospects for a long life and for a 
retirement when the stock market is bullish rather than bearish. Although people’s known 
longevity risks differ at point of retirement, at this much earlier point each person’s known 
longevity as well as investment risks will be roughly the same as any other person’s of a 
comparable age. This will be generally true so long as we restrict ourselves to the sort of 
pension scheme that is occupation-specific, the upshot of which is that the physical 
demands of work and the socio-economic circumstances of the different members of the 
scheme will not vary significantly. In large part because of the fact that known longevity and 
investment risks are both significant and roughly equal at early point of entry into the 
scheme, most will have compelling reasons of self-interest to damp down these risks, via 
their collective pooling into the CDC scheme at this point, rather than going it alone via IDC. 
Risk pooling can be effective even if we partition people into different occupational sectors 
whose members have different known life expectancies and average retirement ages, so 
long as there remains a sufficient number of individuals within each sector to benefit from 
the law of large numbers.20 Those who have lower retirement ages and life expectancies 
because their jobs are physically demanding or less well paid would not want to collectively 
annuitize, in undifferentiated fashion, with others who are longer lived and able to retire 
later. But in an occupation-specific pension scheme, they would be able to reap the 
advantages of pooling just among themselves.21 
 Recall that entry into an occupation will be the only point at which a person will be 
able to choose to join with others in pooling risks. If a person instead opts, at point of entry, 
to go it alone via investment in his own IDC pot, he will not have any future opportunity to 
collectivize his risks in this scheme. Most will therefore find it rational to enter into CDC at 
the outset, even though the cost of exit is high. This will be in their ex ante rational self-
interest. Hence, there will be a sufficient number of people enrolled in the CDC scheme to 
facilitate effective risk pooling and to sustain it over time. 
 It will be useful to draw some parallels here with health insurance. 
                                                                                                             
investment values. I mention the possibility of ethical investment in Section 6 below on Property-Owning 
Democracy. 
19 This is not, however, a classic many-person prisoners’ dilemma, since it would not be rational for every 
single person to defect. 
20 See Heath (2014b). 
21 Even if we limit ourselves to occupation-specific schemes, the natural veil will not be complete, as one will 
be able to infer statistical differences in longevity on the basis of gender and race. But partitioned risk pooling 
would be problematic if it involved segregation by gender or race. 
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 The requirement that one can enter CDC only at the outset, conjoined with a high 
exit penalty, is in order to prevent behavior along the lines of refraining from purchasing 
medical insurance while one is young and healthy and purchasing it only when one is older 
and in less good health. The Obamacare mandate to purchase insurance when young and 
healthy is justified as a means of making possible a ban on excluding, or charging higher 
premiums to, those with pre-existing medical conditions. If there were not something along 
the lines of such a mandate, such a ban would give rise to a serious problem of adverse 
selection, whereby people purchase insurance only after they discover that they have an 
illness or disability that requires expensive medical care. Were that to happen, risks would 
not be spread sufficiently thinly across a large enough pool, and premiums would skyrocket, 
thereby defeating the purpose of purchasing insurance. 
 Unlike the Obamacare insurance mandate, workers are not required to enroll in CDC 
on my proposal. They have the alternative of IDC from the outset. Obamacare could be 
transformed in this direction, so that there is no longer a requirement to purchase medical 
insurance when young and healthy. Dropping this requirement would silence the objection 
against the insurance mandate that it is an unjustifiable restriction on freedom. 
Nevertheless, the purchase of insurance from the beginning of, and throughout, one’s adult 
life could be made a necessary condition of protection from exclusion or higher premium on 
the basis of pre-existing condition.22 There would be no liberty-based argument for barring 
insurance companies from charging actuarial premiums in the case of those who have 
chosen not to take out health insurance at the beginning of their adult lives. The risk of not 
being able to take out affordable insurance later would provide each with a rational 
incentive to purchase health insurance from the outset. 
 In this section I have shown how a case for CDC can be made that overcomes a 
freedom-based objection shared by many on the right. In the next section I shall turn to a 
demonstration of how the realization of CDC even in existing conditions of inequality can be 
defended against objection from the egalitarian left. 
 
5. CDC as Rawlsian Fair Terms of Social Cooperation for Mutual Advantage 
 
In the actual world of unequal income, CDC pensions proportionate to earned income would 
be an improvement over a status quo characterized by IDC pensions proportionate to 
similarly unequal incomes. On account of the benefits of risk pooling and the transfer from 
those who would otherwise be richer to those who would otherwise be poorer that this 
involves, CDC pensions would often be more egalitarian in comparison with the pensions 
that IDC would yield under the same employer and employee contributions.23 CDC would 
tend to be worse than IDC for some of the unlucky who will die prematurely. They would 
lose out on the opportunity to bequeath their pension pot that IDC allows. But 
egalitarianism speaks against bequests. CDC would also tend to be worse than IDC for those 
whose investments would fare best under the latter, since their high returns would be 
transferred to the less fortunate under CDC smoothing. But egalitarians should welcome 
such transfers. The move from IDC to CDC would also promote equality via a modest 
                                   
22 As in the case of Obamacare, this could be accompanied by state subsidies for those who could not 
otherwise afford insurance. 
23 Given the declining marginal utility of money, the egalitarian effects of these transfers would be more 
pronounced when measured in terms of welfare rather than money. 
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increase in the ratio of the income of the “bottom 99 percent” to that of the “top one 
percent.” This is because the average level of those in the bottom 99 percent, whose 
income is mainly earned, would rise under CDC via an improvement in the delivery of their 
pensions, but better pensions would make less of a proportional difference to the more 
largely unearned incomes of the top one percent. 
 Though it would generally constitute an improvement over IDC in the dimension of 
equality, the introduction of CDC pensions proportionate to income here and now would 
nevertheless fall short of the realization of egalitarian justice. In particular, it would fail to 
realize a “luck egalitarian” principle of pensions proportionate to incomes that are unequal 
if and only if these inequalities are traceable to people’s responsible choices rather than 
circumstances beyond their control. On this principle, differences in people’s income should, 
in Ronald Dworkin’s terminology, be ambition-sensitive but endowment-insensitive.24 
Actually existing inequalities in incomes satisfy neither criterion to a substantial degree. 
Insofar, therefore, as pensions are proportionate to existing earnings, their efficient delivery 
via the risk pooling advantages of CDC over IDC would at least mirror, even if not magnify, 
any injustices in the actual distribution of earned income. 
 In contrast to a typical occupational pension, some basic state pensions are largely 
sensitive to number of years worked rather than the amount of money earned. A pension 
whose level were sensitive to nothing other than number of years worked would perfectly 
capture the luck egalitarian principle of endowment-insensitivity under the idealized 
assumptions that the number of years one works is completely under one’s control and the 
utility of labor per unit of time is the same across different people. These assumptions do 
not hold in the real world: some people lack a choice regarding years worked on account of 
involuntary unemployment or disability, and the disutility of low-paid jobs tends to be 
greater than that of high paid jobs. A pension whose level is based only on years worked 
would, however, capture the ambition-sensitivity and endowment-insensitivity of luck 
egalitarianism better than occupational pensions such as CDC that are highly proportionate 
to earnings. 
 Insofar, therefore, as the imperative of equality is concerned, it will be difficult to 
make the case for CDC proportionate to existing income as opposed to occupational 
pensions that are sensitive only to numbers of years worked. Alternatively, CDC pensions 
proportionate to income might be defensible only after one has realized policies that 
redistribute the underlying income itself, perhaps via a complex system of progressive 
taxation, so that this income is ambition- but not endowment-sensitive. 
 In this section, I shall argue that an important element of justice is nevertheless 
captured by CDC pensions proportionate to income, even when the distribution of income 
itself is not in accord with egalitarian principles. There is a justice-based case for collective 
pensions, because justice should be conceived of, not as entirely a matter of the elimination 
of the unfairness of unchosen, brute bad luck, but rather as also involving Rawlsian fair 
                                   
24 See Dworkin (2000, ch. 2). Dworkin (2002, 107) disowns the name “luck egalitarianism,” since he notes that 
his version of egalitarianism “does not aim to eliminate gambles ... from people’s lives”. Alive to this defect 
with the term “luck egalitarianism,” Peter Vallentyne (2002) calls the view “brute luck egalitarianism,” where 
“brute luck” is Dworkin’s term for unchosen bad luck. “Option luck” is Dworkin’s contrasting term for bad luck 
that traces to choice under known risk or uncertainty (e.g., gambles in a casino). I shall employ the term “luck 
egalitarianism” as an abbreviation of the more accurate and informative term “brute luck egalitarianism.” 
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terms of social cooperation for mutual advantage in the division of the fruits of the labor of 
workers.25 
 At its most fundamental level, the principle that constitutes Rawlsian justice is one of 
reciprocity. In particular, we do things to reciprocal advantage, on fair terms, where such 
terms are egalitarian. Rawls writes that 
 
the idea of reciprocity lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (being 
moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as 
everyone’s being advantaged with respect to each person’s present or expected 
future situation as things are. As understood in justice as fairness, reciprocity is a 
relation between citizens expressed by principles of justice that regulate a social 
world in which everyone benefits judged with respect to an appropriate benchmark 
of equality.... (1993, 16-17) 
 
In rejecting the “idea of mutual advantage,” Rawls maintains that justice might call for the 
transformation of a present-day “society in which property, in good part as a result of 
fortune and luck, is very unequal into a well-ordered society regulated by [his] two 
principles of justice.” Justice might call for such a transformation even if, as is likely, not all 
will gain from it, relative to the inegalitarian status quo. Those, for example, “owning large 
properties” may lose “greatly.” (1993, 17) 
 We can agree with Rawls that it is not a necessary condition of justice that all must 
benefit, relative to an unequal status quo. But this does not rule out the possibility of 
mutually beneficial moves from an unjustly unequal status quo that promote justice.  
 In the quoted passage, Rawls analyzes reciprocity as fair terms of social cooperation 
for mutual advantage, as measured against a benchmark of equality. Both mutual advantage 
and equality figure in Rawls’s idea of reciprocity. Each element has a role. 
 The very fact that Rawls describes equality in the distribution of goods as a 
benchmark implies that such equality does not exhaust justice. If, for example, there were 
no cooperation in a world where, as nature would have it, there were no unchosen 
inequalities among different individuals, we would have perfect luck-egalitarian justice. But 
an element of Rawlsian justice would be missing: fair terms of cooperation that make all 
parties better off, when measured against a benchmark of equality. There would also be no 
social justice in such luck egalitarian circumstances. Only natural justice would obtain. 
 Cohen’s (2008, 315-23) luck egalitarian case against the justice of strong Pareto 
improvements that do not promote equality might plausibly apply to benefits to all that are 
the result of brute natural forces – e.g., manna that falls from heaven. But when the 
question is one of how to distribute the fruits of the labor of socially cooperating individuals, 
considerations of justice might apply, which are absent in the natural case. A principle of “to 
                                   
25 Elsewhere, I have proposed that 
 
justice is by no means exhausted by the call to minimize unfairness. The promotion of the general 
welfare is also an element of justice, one which might come into conflict with and outweigh the 
minimization of unfairness. The sacrifice of the general welfare in the … leveling-down case is 
sufficiently great that it outweighs the call to minimize unfairness. On this approach, justice broadly 
conceived consists of the proper balancing of a plurality of distinct and potentially conflicting values 
or principles such as distributive equality, utility, liberty, and the right not to be sacrificed for the 
greater good. (Otsuka 2002, 47-48) 
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each according to his contribution,” where what a worker receives is proportionate to the 
value of his labor contribution, has plausibility when applied to the distribution of the fruits 
of social cooperation from an equal baseline. Such a principle isn’t, however, applicable, at 
least not in any obvious way, to the distribution of manna from heaven. 
 In addition to mutual advantage that arises from an equal baseline, there is another 
way in which equality might combine with mutual advantage to constitute fair terms of 
cooperation: mutual advantage might be realized among parties who regard one another as 
equals. Rawls refers to the benchmark of an equal division in the passage I have quoted. But 
elsewhere he often speaks of “fair terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as 
free and equal.” (2001, 79 [emphasis added]) These two conceptions of equality can come 
apart, in ways that bring out the importance of the latter, as I shall now illustrate. 
 It is plausible to maintain that a benchmark of equality should be choice sensitive – 
one involving equality of opportunity for goods rather than equality of outcome when the 
two come apart. Rawls (1993, 181-2 n. 9) himself is sympathetic to the idea that a Malibu 
surfer who has chosen not to work has received all the primary goods to which he is entitled 
in the form of leisure, even though he lacks enough material resources to sustain himself. 
From a baseline of equality of opportunity, such a surfer might seek earnings from 
employment when his hunger becomes too great. It would, however, be unjust because 
exploitative for a capitalist to take advantage of the surfer’s vulnerability by offering him 
sweatshop terms even if the transaction is mutually advantageous. The capitalist would not 
be showing regard for the surfer as an equal, but rather regarding him as someone to be 
taken advantage of, even though the exploitative transaction arises from a justly equal 
baseline. 
 I have just argued that mutual advantage from the surfer-capitalist baseline of equal 
opportunity for goods needn’t be just because it might involve failure to treat people as 
equals. I shall now argue that mutual advantage from an unequal baseline needn’t be unjust 
because it might involve a regard of one another as equals in a manner that vindicates the 
transaction.  
 Among mutually advantageous moves from an unjustly unequal baseline, we should 
distinguish the following types of case: 
 
1. The mutually advantageous move is coerced via violation of negative rights, as in the case 
of a gunman’s money or life threat. 
 
2. The mutually advantageous move involves an exploitative offer that takes advantage of 
the vulnerability of the weaker party. An exploitative sweatshop work contract in which the 
vulnerability of the worker is not chosen in Malibu-surfer fashion is one such example. Wage 
bargaining by the talented, of the sort that Cohen (2008, ch. 1) condemns in his discussion 
of the incentives argument for inequality, would also qualify. 
 
3. The mutually advantageous move involves neither of the above defects. It is voluntary 
rather than coerced, and the stronger party does not take advantage of the weaker party.  
 
 The move from IDC to CDC is of this third type. It therefore counts as a case of 
genuine reciprocity even though it falls short of an ideal case of justice because it arises 
from an unjustly unequal baseline. Under CDC, each party voluntarily brings his pension 
contributions to the collective, risk-pools these resources with the resources of others, and 
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then gets back in proportion to what he puts in. How much one is able to put in might be a 
reflection of an unjustly unequal baseline distribution of income. But the unjustly rich do not 
take advantage of, or otherwise benefit from, the fact that others are poor. Rather, insofar 
as their agreement is concerned, the positions of the different parties are symmetrical.26 
 Consider an analogous case in which a wealthy carpenter has constructed a sailboat 
without a sail and a poor weaver has weaved sails. They would each like to sell what they 
have produced. Suppose that the value of each sold separately does not add up to the value 
of the two together, given the synergy of their combination. If the poor weaver were 
desperate for the extra proceeds from the synergistic sale, perhaps the wealthy carpenter 
could drive a hard bargain for a disproportionately great share of these proceeds. That 
would be to take advantage of unequal bargaining power. By contrast, an agreement 
analogous to CDC is one in which they voluntarily split the extra proceeds in a manner that 
is proportional to the market value of each when sold separately. As in the sailboat case, the 
baseline in CDC is the value of what each owns when it is not joined together with what 
another owns – i.e., the market value of the assets in one’s non-risk-pooled IDC pension 
pot.27 
 Here I am endorsing a principle which calls for each to receive according to his labor 
contribution. Marx famously rejected such a principle according to which “the individual 
producer receives back from society ...exactly what he gives to it [and the] right of the 
producers is proportional to the labour they supply.” He dismissed this as a bourgeois notion 
that would be superseded: “In a higher phase of communist society, ...after ... all the springs 
of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly -- only then can the narrow horizon of 
bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” (1970, 17-19) Leaving aside surfers 
and others who are in need by purely voluntary choice, we might acknowledge duties on the 
part of the better off to transfer resources to those in need, even when such transfers are 
not mutually advantageous. But when everyone has enough so that nobody is in need, the 
demands of equality needn’t always trump the strong Pareto improvements of mutual 
                                   
26 Rawls speaks of “fair terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life, from one generation to the next” (1993, 3 [emphasis 
added]). CDC’s investment risk pooling is sometimes characterized as designed to subsidize older pensioners 
by younger workers. That is a mischaracterization. Rather, CDC is designed so that those who enjoy more 
favorable returns on the stock market during their lifetimes subsidize those who enjoy less favorable returns. 
The smoothing favors the unlucky over the lucky, irrespective of their age or the generation to which they 
belong. Such a bias is fair both to different generations and to the young versus the old. 
27 Joseph Heath suggests a different interpretation of Rawls as judging occupational pension schemes just 
simply insofar as they have been voluntarily entered into in accordance with the law, on grounds that such 
schemes are not part of the basic structure. Heath notes that Rawls claims that his principles of social justice 
do not apply to voluntary associations such as universities and business firms, which lie outside of the basic 
structure. (See Heath 2014a, 160-3.) But the questions of whether CDC should be permitted by the state rather 
than regulated out of existence, and, if permitted, whether tax relief should be extended to CDC pensions 
contributions, seem clearly to be questions regarding the basic structure. Moreover, for reasons G. A. Cohen 
has offered, I would maintain that Rawlsian principles of justice ought to apply, far more extensively than 
Rawls thought they should, to the private choices of employers and employees. (See Cohen 2008, esp. ch. 3.)  
Discussions among USS members regarding recent pension reforms reflect the conviction that considerations 
of equality, fairness (equity), and progressivity of effect are highly relevant to the justification of reforms to the 
pension scheme. Typically, however, the scope of these concerns is limited to the membership and doesn’t 
extend to those outside the scheme who are worse off. Perhaps this reflects the belief that there is a special 
requirement for terms of cooperation to be fair. 
15 
 
advantage when the two come into conflict. In these circumstances beyond the realm of 
needs, these two elements of justice – equality and mutual advantage – stand in a more 
equal relation to one another. A state pension should be sufficient to meet our basic needs 
for income in retirement. Above that floor, there is a sound case for the mutually beneficial 
risk-pooling of CDC even if it arises from a baseline of unequal income.28 
 
6. Property-Owning Democracy 
 
Unfunded “pay-as-you-go” DB pensions conform to the model of a redistributive welfare 
state that is characterized by transfers of income from one group of people in society to 
another – in this case, from those who are working to those who are retired. A funded 
pension scheme such as CDC, by contrast, fits the model of a “property-owning democracy,” 
which Rawls endorses in preference to “welfare state capitalism.”29 Rawls maintains that 
 
the background institutions of property-owning democracy work to disperse the 
ownership of wealth and capital ... not by the redistribution of income to those with 
less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the widespread 
ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and trained 
skills) at the beginning of each period.... The intent is not simply to assist those who 
lose out through accident and misfortune ..., but rather to put all citizens in a 
position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and 
economic equality. (2001, 139) 
 
Rawls expresses the hope that, in a property-owning democracy, “most things can be left to 
citizens and associations themselves, provided they are put in a position to take charge of 
their own affairs and are able to make fair agreements with one another under social 
conditions ensuring a suitable degree of equality.” (2001, 159)  
 In DB pension schemes, where employers bear most of the risks, it is inevitable that 
management will also insist upon extensive rights of governance of the pension scheme. 
Under CDC, by contrast, there will be a stronger case, and more scope, for workers to “take 
charge of” and “manage their own affairs.” In this regard, CDC is analogous to traditional 
IDC pension schemes, where management leaves workers on their own to bear all the risks. 
Management doesn’t claim control over IDC pension pots, in spite of the fact that they 
typically make substantial contributions into these pots. They value the fact that their 
responsibility extends no farther than the depositing of the promised sum into the pot each 
month. Just as management does not interfere with the investment decisions of individuals 
with IDC pots, but washes their hands of this and leaves it to workers (often outsourcing the 
pension fund to some outside organization), they shouldn’t feel the need to interfere with 
                                   
28 There is also the following pragmatic argument that we should not hold the aspect of justice involving 
mutual advantage hostage to the egalitarian aspect: the latter will be more difficult to achieve, since it involves 
a sacrifice of the interests of some, relative to the status quo, whereas the former does not. There is a case for 
not making the ideally just the enemy of the good. 
29 In a “pay-as-you-go” scheme, the pensions of retired workers are paid for by the contemporaneous pensions 
contributions of current workers. In a funded pension, by contrast, the pensions of retired workers are paid for 
by their own previous pensions contributions when in employment, along with subsequent investment 
returns. Whereas not all DB pensions are “pay as you go,” since some of them are funded, by definition all DC 
pensions are funded. 
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CDC investments. The decision of workers, under CDC, to “make fair agreements with one 
another” to pool their funds among themselves does not transform the DC pension pot into 
a concern of management. 
 Workers should also be left free to run their CDC pension schemes as non-profit 
mutual societies with no external shareholders. In this way, they would not, as under a 
traditional IDC, be forced, upon retirement, to enter into a contract for an annuity or 
financial services with a for-profit corporation whose shareholders are other than the 
workers in the collective. Rather, they would remain invested members of their own mutual 
society, with pension income paid out of the pooled resources of the collective throughout 
their retirement. There would also be no need to attract outside investors to start and 
sustain their pension fund. Scheme members could instead draw upon the steady stream of 
small monthly pensions contributions from workers and their employers.30 
 The fact that CDC funds are under the autonomous control of workers, rather than 
management or external shareholders, might give rise to practices of ethical investment. 
Rather than everyone being bound by a majority decision of all members of the CDC 
collective regarding the ethical investment of a single fund, the arrangement could involve 
unanimous consent, whereby each person chooses from a range of different funds, each 
invested in accordance with a different set of ethical principles – including the null set, 
which would presumably be ordinary nihilistic investment, with no concern for anything 
other than financial returns. Apart from the constraint that one would require the company 
of enough like-minded others to gain the benefits of risk pooling and economies of scale, 
there needn’t be any limit to the number, or the ideological orientation, of the funds.31 
 In arguing that Rawlsian property-owning democracy unjustifiably minimizes the role 
of welfare state provision involving taxation and transfer, Ben Jackson writes: 
 
if the major forms of individual property ownership that could plausibly be equalized 
in contemporary capitalist societies are home ownership and shares in private 
companies, then, as the financial crisis of 2008 has made clear, this will inevitably 
involve the exposure of individuals to significant financial risk. It is therefore crucial 
to secure individuals against such risks through collective social welfare provision if 
the property-owning democracy strategy is to be pursued. (2012, 48) 
 
One of the main themes of this chapter, however, is that the mutual association of workers, 
and the pooling of their pensions contributions, is a means, beyond state transfers to the 
unfortunate, of protecting people against financial risk. Such risk-pooling can provide a fairly 
high level of financial security even when pensions contributions are invested primarily in 
stocks and shares, thereby allowing workers to share in the proceeds of the growth of the 
economy. James Meade himself, from whom Rawls borrowed the very term “property-
                                   
30 It would be a virtue to some, such as R. H. Tawney, who are associated with the idea of property-owning 
democracy, that the income-bearing assets in the pension fund derive, via such contributions, from labour 
income and in this respect are “related to genuine productive effort.” See Jackson (2012, 41). 
31 The funds would not necessarily have to possess the familiar leftist tilt into green and socially responsible 
investment. There is, for example, a Catholic Values Fund that restricts its investments to companies that are 
not at odds with the teachings of the Church. And there is a once-infamously-named Vice fund (since 
rebranded), which purchases stock in firms devoted to armaments, tobacco, gambling, alcohol, and 
pornography. 
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owning democracy,” called for something closely resembling the investment approach of a 
CDC pension fund when he advocated “the encouragement of financial intermediaries in 
which small savings can be pooled for investment in high-earning risk bearing securities” 
(Meade 1964, 59). 
 Large, occupational, collective, funded pension schemes can give rise to the 
voluntary provision of primary goods that the state would otherwise need to step in to 
deliver, via tax and transfer. Especially where there are political constraints on the raising of 
such taxes, we should attend to the full range of instruments at our disposal for securing 
such goods through the private firms and voluntary associations that form civil society.32 We 
should facilitate those voluntary collective schemes that most efficiently convert the 
pensions contributions of workers into income in retirement, without excessive profit-taking 
by the wealthy through management charges and shareholder earnings. The less of his 
wage or salary a worker needs to set aside in order to generate a good pension, the more 
income from labor will be available for taxation for purposes of redistribution to the least 
advantaged, who thereby also benefit from the well-designed collective occupational 
pensions of others. 
 
  
                                   
32 There is a default tendency of some on the left to appeal too exclusively to the state to bring about social 
justice via public sector institutions funded out of general taxation. Obama’s Affordable Care Act, for example, 
was strongly opposed by some on the left who wanted to hold out for a single payer system in which the state 
acts as the sole provider of health insurance on the model of Canadian Medicare. The British National Health 
Service is regarded by some on the left as better still, insofar as health care itself in the form of state run 
hospitals and public sector physicians – and not merely insurance for it – is provided by the state. But the 
provision of health care via private insurance and multiple payers in, for example, France has given rise to care 
in that country that the World Health Organization has deemed superior to the more complete state provision 
in the neighboring UK. 
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